Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson,
and Jennifer Van Boerum, aka Jennifer Heather
Olson v. American Fire and Casualty Company, an
Ohio corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James A. McIntosh; James A. McIntosh & Associates; Attorney for Appellees.
Jill M. Aggeler; Paul H. Matthews; Kirton & McConkie; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, Jennifer Van Boerum, Jennifer Heather Olson v. American Fire and Casualty
Company, No. 960086 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/62

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH
DOC! _ r
KFy
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

" " *

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H.
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, and
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellate Court No. 960086-CA
Priority No. (15)

vs.
AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,

Trial Court Civil No. 930902492

Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

James A. Mcintosh (2194)
JAMES A. McINTOSH &
ASSOCIATES
1399 South 700 East, #17
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorney for Appellees Myra L. Taylor,
Ronald H. Olson, Carol D.
Olson, and Jennifer Van Boerum
aka Jennifer Heather Olson

Jill M. Aggeler (5654)
Paul H. Matthews (2122)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
American Fire and Casualty Company

•" 2 3 1996

;v APPEALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
• > U M M \ m <)l

iv

M « i U M I Nl

1

ARGUMENT

3

I.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO. THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INVOLVING
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON AND MYRA TAYLOR CONSTITUTES AN
"OCCURRENCE" UNDER THE TERMS OF THE INSURANCE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSONS AND AMERICAN, SUCH
OCCURRENCE IS UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS
OF THAT CONTRACT
3

II.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE TO DEMONSTRATE
AMERICAN BREACHED ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY IT MAY HAVE
OWED TO THE OLSON APPELLEES, NOR IS THE
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT AMBIGUOUS IN ITS
EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE FOR THOSE CLAIMS ASSERTED f
APPELLEES

4

APPELLEES ARE BARRED FROM RAISING ANY ARGUMENT
REGARDING THE "DEAD STORAGE EXCEPTION" OF THE
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT

6

ill.

IV.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO. APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO RAISE
THE "DEAD STORAGE" EXCEPTION ON APPEAL FOR THE
FIRST TIME, THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE
DEMONSTRATE THAT EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE

V.

THE INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSON
APPELLEES AND AMERICAN UNEQUIVOCALLY EXCLUDES
THE CLAIMS CONTAINED IN COUNT FIVE OF THE
UNDERLYING COMPLAINT FILED BY MYRA TAVT OK AGAINST
THE OLSONS

-ii-

24

VI.

THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
OLSON APPELLEES AND AMERICAN UNAMBIGUOUSLY
EXCLUDES COVERAGE FOR THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
CLAIMS IN COUNT 5 OF THE TAYLOR V. OLSON COMPLAINT . .

27

THE EXCLUSION FOR STATUTORILY IMPOSED VICARIOUS
PARENTAL LIABILITY CONTAINED IN THE HOMEOWNER'S
INSURANCE CONTRACT IS NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY, NOR IS IT VOID .
.

28

VIIL AMERICAN SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN
THE TAYLOR V. OLSON LITIGATION
.....

29

VII.

IX.

APPELLEES CAN DEMONSTRATE NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 11 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

CONCLUSION

31
32

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993)

5, 23, 27

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Geiwitz, 86 Md.App. 704,
587 A.2d 1185 (1991)

14, 16

Beale v. Lawrence,
Shelby Law No. 67 (April 8, 1985, Tenn. App.)

14, 16

Bowen v. The Hanover Ins. Co.,
599 A.2d 1150 (Me. 1991)

17, 18

Broadway v. Great American Ins. Co.,
465 So.2d 1124 (Ala. 1985)

18, 20

Carley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 10 ConnApp. 135,
521 A.2d 1053 (1987)
Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.,
987 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1993), reh. den.
992 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1993)

.23

30

Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985)

28, 29

Holliman v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co.,
711 S.W.2d 159 (Ark. 1986)

19, 20

Hollis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.,
416 S.E.2d 827 (Ga.App. 1992)

20, 21

Mascair v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
619 So.2d 108 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 1993)
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987)
McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977)

-iv-

20
8, 26
29

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen,
68 N.CApp. 184, 314 S.E.2d 552 (1984),
rev den. 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142
North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 442 N.W.2d 848
(Minn.App. 1989)
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's
Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, reh. den.,
cert, den., 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah App. 1994)
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allaire, 25 Mass.App. 159,
516 N.E.2d 179 (1987)
Robertson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
569 A.2d 565 (Conn.App. 1990)

12-14
20

6
20
21, 23, 26

U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt,
854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)

23, 25

US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n.,
886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994), reh. den

6

Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan,
899 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1995)

6

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)

7

•v-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Appellees were
entitled to partial summary judgment in their favor, and that the homeowner's
insurance contract between Defendant/Appellant, American Fire and Casualty Company
("American"), and the Olson Appellees, gave rise to a duty to defend and indemnify
the Olson Appellees in Taylor v. Olson, formerly pending in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County. The homeowner's insurance contract unambiguously and
unequivocally excludes coverage for the matters, events and damages alleged by Myra
Taylor against the Olsons in connection with the automobile accident of October 17,
1987, as outlined in her Complaint.
Regardless of whether this Court concludes the subject automobile accident
constitutes an "occurrence" under the terms of the homeowner's insurance contract,
such an "occurrence" must not fall within any of the applicable exclusions of that
contract. In this case, the exclusions of the contract between American and the Olson
Appellees unambiguously bar Appellees' claims for coverage in this case.
Notwithstanding Appellees' delineation of Utah legal authority addressing
insurance contractual obligations, there is no evidence in this case that American
breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Appellees. Moreover, the trial court
has specifically refrained from ruling with regard to Appellees' claim for bad faith
against American, which claim has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
Insofar as Appellees have never, at any time in these proceedings, raised the
"dead storage" exception of the homeowner's insurance contract as a possible basis for

coverage, they are not entitled to raise it before this tribunal at the present time.
Even assuming, arguendo. Appellees were entitled to advance an argument regarding
the "dead storage" exception, however, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate
the foregoing exception is entirely inapplicable.
The insurance contract between American and the Olson Appellees
unambiguously excludes all the claims asserted by Myra Taylor in her Complaint
against the Olsons, including the negligent supervision claim delineated in Count 5 of
that Complaint. Moreover, there is no evidence that any of the three automobile
exclusions contained in the subject insurance contract are ambiguous, just as there is no
evidence of ambiguity with respect to the "dead storage" exception to the foregoing
exclusions. In addition, the Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of
Appellees, which comprises the entire basis for this appeal, includes no findings that
any of the automobile exclusions, or the "dead storage" exception, are vague or
ambiguous. Accordingly, Appellees cannot now contend any such ambiguities exist, nor
are they entitled to have them addressed by this tribunal for the first time.
As noted above, all of the causes of action contained in the Taylor Complaint,
including Count 5, are unequivocally excluded under the terms of the insurance
contract. Further, the exclusion for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability is not
contrary to public policy, nor is it void.
Even assuming, arguendo, the exclusions of the homeowner's contract did not
definitively bar coverage for all those causes of action asserted in the Taylor Complaint,
-2-

American would not be bound by the self-serving Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order prepared by counsel for Taylor prior to becoming counsel for Taylor and
the Olsons, insofar as Taylor v. Olson addressed issues collateral to the items at issue
herein.
Finally, there is no basis for an award of attorney's fees against American,
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The assertions made by
Appellees in support of this claim are entirely unsupported by the documents on file
with the Court herein, as well as those documents filed with Judge Noel in the trial
court.
ARGUMENT
I.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INVOLVING
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON AND MYRA TAYLOR CONSTITUTES AN
"OCCURRENCE" UNDER THE TERMS OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE OLSONS AND AMERICAN, SUCH OCCURRENCE IS
UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT CONTRACT.
Regardless of whether this Court determines the automobile accident involving
Jennifer Heather Olson and Myra Taylor on October 17, 1987, constitutes an
"occurrence," as defined by the homeowner's insurance contract between the Olson
Appellees and American, Appellees are not entitled to coverage under the terms of the
foregoing contract. Rather, as discussed extensively in the Brief of Appellant, the
homeowner's insurance contract unambiguously and unequivocally excludes coverage for
the matters, events and damages alleged by Myra Taylor against the Olsons in
-3-

connection with the automobile accident of October 17, 1987. Therefore, even if
Appellees have met "the first prong of this two-step process," as they contend, they
cannot meet the second prong in light of the clear exclusionary language of the subject
contract comprising the subject matter of this lawsuit. See Brief of Appellees, at 12.

n.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE TO DEMONSTRATE AMERICAN
BREACHED ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY IT MAY HAVE OWED TO THE OLSON
APPELLEES, NOR IS THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT
AMBIGUOUS IN ITS EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE FOR THOSE CLAIMS
ASSERTED BY APPELLEES.
Notwithstanding the delineation of Utah legal authority addressing first-party and
third-party insurance contract obligations in the Brief of Appellees, there is no evidence
in this case that American breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Appellees.
In fact, while Judge Noel granted Appellees' motion for partial summary judgment on
the basis of a finding of coverage under the terms of the subject insurance contract, he
specifically refrained from ruling with regard to Appellees' separate claim for bad faith
against American.
American acknowledges, as Appellees contend, that Utah Courts "have
established certain rules or standards of interpretation with respect to exclusions and
ambiguities in insurance policies, even when fiduciary duties are not involved." (See
Brief of Appellees, at 14.) In fact, American discusses Utah legal authority addressing
interpretation of insurance contracts in its Brief. (See Brief of Appellant, at 16.) As
noted in American's Brief, while an ambiguous term in an insurance contract should be
-4-

construed in favor of coverage, unambiguous terms should be "construed according to
[their] usual and ordinary meaning." Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272,
1274 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
It is difficult to conceive of exclusions more unambiguous than those contained
in the insurance contract at issue in this litigation. The foregoing contract
unequivocally excludes coverage for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of
"the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles . . . owned or
operated by or rented or loaned to an insured." The homeowner's insurance contract
between American and the Olson Appellees further contains an exclusion for bodily
injury or property damage stemming from "the entrustment by an insured of a motor
vehicle . . . to any person." Further, coverage under the insurance contract is excluded
for "statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor"
using a vehicle excluded under either of the foregoing provisions. To the extent that
Myra Taylor's claims against the Olsons in the Taylor v. Olson litigation arose directly
from Jennifer Heather Olson's use of a vehicle owned by Ronald Olson, the foregoing
exclusions unambiguously and definitively bar any claim for benefits Appellees could
assert under that insurance contract.

-5-

ffl.
APPELLEES ARE BARRED FROM RAISING ANY ARGUMENT REGARDING
THE "DEAD STORAGE EXCEPTION" OF THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
CONTRACT.
It is a fundamental rule that a reviewing court will not address an issue or
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 899 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1995); Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's
Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, reh. den., cert, den., 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
App. 1994).
Although there are exceptions to the foregoing rule, these exceptions are carved
narrowly. As this Court noted in US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 886 P.2d
1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994), reh. den., such exceptions do not arise in the absence of
"extraordinary circumstances or plain error." No such exceptions are applicable to the
issues raised by Appellees for the first time in these proceedings in their Brief filed
March 8, 1996.
Appellees are now urging this Court to find that none of the three automobile
exclusions in the subject insurance contract apply to the claims of Myra Taylor insofar
as such exclusions are subject to a "dead storage" exception in the contract. As an
initial matter, Appellees offer no reason for their failure to raise this argument for the
first time on appeal in an opposition brief, notwithstanding the fact they have been
arguing about coverage under the insurance contract for several years. Presumably, no
such justification exists.
-6-

More significant than their lack of justification, however, is that Appellees'
argument clearly does not fall within either of the two exceptions Appellees cite under
which a reviewing court may address an issue notwithstanding its being presented for
the first time on appeal. First, Appellees contend that "the issue of whether the
Volkswagen was in 'dead storage' is one of law only . . . . See Brief of Appellees, at
18, footnote 21. They do not offer any explanation or legal authority in support of the
foregoing statement, but rather, hold the foregoing assertion out, by itself, as the
justification for the "question of law" exception to the rule.
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines a question of law as "[a]n issue
which involves the application or interpretation of a law and hence within the province
of the judge and not the jury." Under the foregoing definition, whether the
Volkswagen was in "dead storage" at the time of the automobile accident involving
Jennifer Heather Olson and Myra Taylor would not appear to constitute a "question of
law," but rather, is an issue involving the factual circumstances present in this case.
The undisputed facts of this lawsuit, which are cited and relied upon by Appellees in
their Brief, definitively establish the Volkswagen driven by Jennifer Heather Olson on
the night of October 17, 1987, was not in "dead storage." Accordingly, there exists no
question regarding the foregoing issue, either of fact, or of law, and, therefore, the
"question of law" exception to the rule that an issue may not be raised for the first
time on appeal does not apply.

-7-

The second argument advanced by Appellees in support of their contention they
are entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception of the insurance contract for the first
time on appeal is that "the issue of whether the Volkswagen was in 'dead storage' . . .
is plainly decisive of the entire controversy on the merits, and it is further clear no
possible advantage was had by either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial
court." See Brief of Appellees, at 18, footnote 21. If the Court accepts Appellees'
assertion that the "dead storage" exception is plainly decisive of the entire controversy
in this case on the merits, for purposes of this appeal, the foregoing exception is plainly
decisive of this case in favor of Appellant. As discussed more fully below, even if
Appellees had an entitlement to raise the "dead storage" exception now, there is no
conceivable basis for its applicability to the undisputed facts of this lawsuit, facts to
which Appellees cite in their own Brief.
Finally, Appellees' argument that "there was no possible advantage to be had by
either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial court" is wholly without merit.
There have been no Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law with regard to this issue,
nor did Judge Noel address it in connection with his ruling on Appellees' motion for
partial summary judgment. American is clearly at a disadvantage in this case in being
forced to respond to an issue that was never raised during the several years that have
elapsed in these proceedings, and was never addressed by Judge Noel in his ruling on
the motion for partial summary judgment, which ruling comprises the basis for this
entire appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938
-8-

(Utah 1987), "matters not raised at the trial court level will not be considered by this
Court on appeal, particularly when the problem could have been resolved below."
(Emphasis added.)
Appellees can offer no basis or justification for their failure to raise the issue of
the "dead storage" exception contained in the homeowner's insurance contract until
March 8, 1996, the date on which they filed their Brief in connection with this appeal.
Accordingly, insofar as Appellees can demonstrate no basis for the application of an
exception to the rule that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
Appellees are not entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception at present.
IV.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO RAISE THE 'T>EAD
STORAGE" EXCEPTION ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE DEMONSTRATE THAT EXCEPTION IS
INAPPLICABLE.
As noted above, Appellees are not entitled to raise the "dead storage" exception
as an issue on appeal, where they have had numerous opportunities over the course of
the past several years to address this exception, and have never done so. Further, it is
clear that Appellees' failure to raise this exception prior to this appeal cannot be
obviated by the narrowly-carved exceptions to the rule that an issue may not be raised
for the first time on appeal where it is not raised in the trial court.
Even assuming, arguendo. Appellees were entitled to raise the "dead storage"
exception for the first time on appeal, the foregoing exception is entirely inapplicable in
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light of the undisputed facts and circumstances at issue in this case. The insurance
contract at issue in this litigation unambiguously and unequivocally excludes coverage
for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles owned or operated by, or rented or loaned
to an insured. In addition, the insurance contract contains a specific exclusion for
bodily injury or property damage stemming from the entrustment by an insured of a
motor vehicle to any person. Coverage under the insurance contract is further
excluded for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or
minor using a vehicle excluded in either of the foregoing provisions. (R 43)
Appellees contend that these three exclusions, which would otherwise preclude
coverage under the insurance contract, are inapplicable in light of the "dead storage"
exception outlined in the contract. This exception provides that the three exclusions
delineated above do not apply to "a vehicle or conveyance not subject to motor vehicle
registration which is . . . in dead storage on an insured location." (R 43) An
examination of the undisputed facts and circumstances surrounding this lawsuit, as well
as a review of extensive legal authority addressing the "dead storage" exception cited by
Appellees, demonstrates their attempted reliance on this exception is wholly misplaced.
Appellees further contend that "[t]he Volkswagen Jennifer Heather Olson was
driving on the night of the accident was in 'dead storage' since it was not registered,
insured, licensed, roadworthy, and was not to be driven on the public highways." See
Brief of Appellees, at 15. The foregoing statement completely contradicts assertions
-10-

made in the Statement of Facts portion of this same Brief, however. For example,
Appellees state: "Heather had taken the 1974 Volkswagen Bug automobile on
numerous occasions prior to the accident on October 17, 1987, and for various types of
activities such as going to school, going riding with friends, going to weekend parties
where alcoholic beverages were served, etc." See Brief of Appellees, at 7. Appellees
further contend, in their Statement of Facts:
Heather was in the habit of taking the keys to the 1974
Volkswagen Bug out of her parents' dresser drawer in their
bedroom . . . .
Heather would take an old license plate from the garage of
her parents' home and put it on the Volkswagen whenever
she would take it. The license plate belonged to her sister
Heidi's former Suzuki automobile.
See Brief of Appellees, at 8.
Appellees are asking this Court to accept their factual representation that
Jennifer Heather Olson drove the vehicle involved in the accident with Myra Taylor
"on numerous occasions" prior to the night on which that accident occurred. A few
pages later in this same Brief, however, Appellees are asking this Court to conclude
the foregoing vehicle, which Jennifer Heather Olson drove with some frequency, was
actually in "dead storage," and, therefore, that the three automobile exclusions
contained in the insurance contract are inapplicable. In addition to being completely
contradictory, the foregoing arguments are not even supported by the legal authority
discussed in the Brief of Appellees to advance those arguments.
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One of the three cases cited by Appellees in support of their contention the
Volkswagen Bug involved in the automobile accident with Myra Taylor was actually in
"dead storage" is Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.CApp. 184, 314 S.E.2d
552 (1984), rev den. 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142. A review of the facts of this case,
and the legal theories on which its holding is based, reveals it is inapposite to the
instant appeal.
In Allen, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina addressed a claim for property
damage arising from a fire which ignited while the insured was attempting to charge
the battery of an inoperable motorcycle. The motorcycle, which was unregistered and
uninsured, had been stored on the patio of the insured's apartment for six months,
continuously, because mechanical damage had rendered it totally inoperable during that
period. Id. at 554. The owner of the motorcycle decided to move it into his living
room on a day he was not working for the purpose of charging the battery, checking
the timing mechanism, and determining what repairs were needed to render it
operable. As the Allen Court noted, the vehicle could not be driven, and the insured
"had no repair parts available and did not intend to repair it that day." Id. A fire
subsequently ignited in the insured's living room when the motorcycle tipped over on
top of his coffee table.
The insured then made a claim under his homeowner's insurance contract for
damages caused by the motorcycle igniting in his living room. His insurer denied this
claim, citing the exclusion for damage arising out of the "ownership" and "maintenance"
-12-

of a motor vehicle. Id. at 555. The Allen Court ruled in favor of the insured,
however, noting the foregoing exclusion did not apply, and stated:
It was [the insured's] handling of combustible materials
(newspapers, plastic floor covering, gasoline, oil) in the
immediate vicinity of ignition sources (an operating electrical
battery trickle charger and an open light bulb as a timing
light left upon a metal frame of the motorcycle) which
created a risk covered by Nationwide-Fire's policy against
personal liability and caused the fire . . . . We hold that
the property damage which occurred did not arise out of
either the ownership or the maintenance of the Honda
motorcycle.
Id.
The Allen decision is easily distinguished from the facts of the instant case in
that it involved an accident that occurred within the home of an insured, which
accident did not arise out of the ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle, but
rather, the handling of combustible materials within that home. Conversely, the
accident at issue in Taylor v. Olson arose directly from the operation of a vehicle
owned by the insured, which accident occurred away from the Olsons' home, while the
vehicle was in operation.
Another crucial distinction between the Allen decision and the instant case is the
fact that in Allen, the motorcycle at issue could not be driven for six months prior to
the date on which the subject accident occurred. In this case, however, the undisputed
facts cited by Appellees establish the 1974 Volkswagen Bug was driven by Jennifer
Heather Olson "on numerous occasions" prior to the night of the accident, and,
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therefore, that such vehicle was in fact in operable. In upholding the trial court's
determination the motorcycle had been in dead storage at the time of the subject
accident, the Allen Court noted not only that the vehicle was not registered or insured,
but also, that it was not operable at the time of that accident. By Appellees' own
admission, the Volkswagen involved in the accident with Myra Taylor was in fact very
"operable," as evidenced by the fact Jennifer Heather Olson was driving it on the night
of such accident, as she had on numerous prior occasions.
Similarly, in Beale v. Lawrence, Shelby Law No. 67 (April 8, 1985, Tenn. App.),
the second case cited by Appellees, that court ruled a vehicle was in "dead storage,"
and, therefore, not subject to the automobile exclusions in a homeowner's insurance
contract, where that vehicle was inoperable for several months prior to the occurrence
giving rise to the coverage claim. Again, Beale is easily distinguished from the instant
factual situation, which involves a vehicle that was, by Appellees' own admission,
operable at the time of the subject accident.
The only other legal authority cited by Appellees in support of the application
of the "dead storage" exception in this case is Allstate Ins. Co. v. Geiwitz, 86 Md.App.
704, 587 A.2d 1185 (1991). As with Allen and Beale, an examination of the facts and
issues addressed in Geiwitz reveals that it, too, is inapposite to the circumstances at
issue in the instant case.
In Geiwitz, the plaintiff purchased an automobile for the sole purpose of
restoring it "for show purposes," and kept it at the home of his parents while he
-14-

disassembled it. Id. at 1185-86. The plaintiff proceeded to restore the vehicle over the
course of approximately two years, and during his deposition testified that when the
restoration of the vehicle was completed, he did not drive it, even to exhibitions, but
rather, used a truck-pulled trailer. Further, the plaintiff noted the foregoing vehicle
was "just for show. It wasn't made for driving." Id. at 1186.
One evening Mr. Geiwitz drove the vehicle to his parents' garage for the
purpose of fixing the gas gauge, and brought a kerosene heater from the garage of
their home. When the plaintiff drained the gas from his vehicle prior to fixing the
gauge, it overflowed in a bucket and ignited the kerosene heater, ultimately resulting in
extensive fire damage to his parents' home, as well as the destruction of the plaintiffs
vehicle. Id.
The plaintiff, who resided in his parents' home, was deemed to be an insured
under the terms of their homeowner's insurance contract. Although the homeowner's
insurer, Allstate, compensated the plaintiffs parents for the property damage to their
home, it filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the destruction of
the vehicle was covered under the policy, and relied upon the contract's exclusion for
property damage arising from "the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting,
loaning, entrusting, loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer." Id.
The insured contended, however, that the foregoing exclusion was rendered inapplicable
by the following exception in the contract: "[T]his exclusion does not apply to . . . a
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motorized land vehicle in dead storage or used exclusively on an insured premises . . .
." Id. at 1187.
In addressing the question of whether the Geiwitz vehicle was in "dead storage"
at the time of the subject accident, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed numerous
cases from other jurisdictions, including the Broadway, Holliman, Prudential Property,
and North Star cases discussed extensively below, all of which conclude the vehicles at
issue did not fall within the "dead storage" exceptions of the various homeowner's
insurance contracts. After analyzing the facts and holdings in each of these cases, the
Geiwitz Court concluded: "The primary difference between these cases and the case
sub judice is the fact that Geiwitz kept the car as a collectable, not as a means of
transportation." Id. at 1188 (emphasis added). The transportation of the Geiwitz
vehicle "via a truck-pulled trailer" stands in stark contrast to the undisputed use of the
Volkswagen at issue in this litigation, Le., being driven "on numerous occasions . . . and
for various types of activities such as going to school, going riding with friends, going to
weekend parties where alcoholic beverages were served, etc." See Brief of Appellees,
at 7.
In reaching its decision, the Geiwitz Court also noted that "one court . . . has
held that a car can undergo maintenance and still be in dead storage," and cited Beale,
the decision referenced by Appellees in their Brief and discussed, supra. In
distinguishing the facts and holding of the Beale decision, published exclusively on
LEXIS, the Maryland Court of Appeals delineated the following reasons for the
-16-

decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in finding coverage under the "dead
storage" exception of the policy at issue therein:
The court concluded that it was in dead storage for several
reasons: (1) the car had been inoperable for several
months, (2) the car did not have a current city sticker, and
(3) the owner used another vehicle for transportation. The
court also noted that even if the owner successfully had
moved the car from the carport to his parents' residence,
"the simple movement of the vehicle did not affect its
status." That is, the mere fact that the owner moved the
car from one storage site to another did not take the car
out of dead storage within the meaning of the insurance
policy.
Id. at 1189 (quoting Beale) (emphasis added). As noted above, Beale is easily
distinguished from the instant case for several reasons, including the fact that Jennifer
Heather Olson was not merely moving the Volkswagen "from one storage site to
another" at the time of the accident with Myra Taylor, but rather, was driving the fullyoperable vehicle as she had on "numerous occasions" prior to that evening. Further,
unlike the vehicle in Beale, the Volkswagen had not "been inoperable for several
months." Id.
Case law from numerous other jurisdictions further illustrates the inapplicability
of the "dead storage" exception to the claims of Appellees in the instant case. In
Bowen v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 599 A.2d 1150 (Me. 1991), for example, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine denied benefits to an insured under a homeowner's insurance
contract for personal injury liability arising when the insured's pickup truck rolled from
his yard into an adjacent street. The pickup truck had not been operable for more
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than five months prior to the subject accident, was not registered, and had a dead
battery, and, therefore, the insured asserted the foregoing vehicle, which he intended to
sell or "scrap," was in "dead storage" at the time of the accident. Id,
Notwithstanding the foregoing undisputed facts, the Bowen Court rejected the
insured's arguments regarding the applicability of the "dead storage" exception, and
stated:
The fact that this vehicle was unregistered, disabled and not
in use does not change the fact that this accident happened
because the object was a motor vehicle and for no other
reason . . . . Dead storage means that the vehicle is placed
in some condition where it has no potential to cause harm
because of its attributes as a vehicle.
Id at 1151 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Broadway v. Great American Ins. Co., 465 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Ala.
1985), the Alabama Supreme Court concluded injuries sustained by a homeowner while
priming an automobile carburetor with gasoline were not covered under his
homeowner's insurance contract, which contract contained an exclusion for injuries
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of . . . a motor
vehicle owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured . . . ." The Broadway
Court rejected the insured's assertion that the vehicle, which had remained undriveable
at his home for approximately three months, was in "dead storage," thereby invoking an
exception to the foregoing exclusion in the insurance contract. In reaching its decision,
the Court noted:
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As this Court perceives the terms "dead storage" and
"maintenance of a motor vehicle," they are mutually
exclusive. In other words, a motor vehicle in dead storage
is one which is not undergoing maintenance, while a vehicle
which is undergoing maintenance cannot be in dead storage.
Id at 1127 (emphasis added).
In a case involving similar factual circumstances, Holliman v. MFA Mut. Ins.
Co., 711 S.W.2d 159 (Ark. 1986), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a claim for
coverage under a homeowner's insurance contract arising out of an accident occurring
when the brother of an insured poured gasoline into the carburetor of an automobile
which was never registered or licensed. The vehicle did, however, have inflated tires,
water in the radiator, and likely had gasoline in the tank, and was, in the words of the
Holliman Court, "essentially ready to drive, except it would not start." Id.
The brother of the insured sustained injuries when he attempted to start the
foregoing vehicle, during which attempt the gasoline ignited and burned him. Id. After
the brother of the insured sued the insured, Holliman, he in turn requested coverage
under the terms of his homeowner's insurance contract with MFA Mutual Insurance
Company. MFA denied this request, however, relying on the following exclusion in the
insurance contract: "This policy does not apply . . . to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading, or unloading
. . . [of] any motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to any insured
. . . ." Id. Holliman in turn cited an exception to the foregoing exclusion contained in
the insurance contract, which provided the exclusion did not apply "if the motor vehicle
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is not subject to motor vehicle registration because it is used exclusively on the
residence premises or kept in dead storage on the residence premises." Id.
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the insured's contention that the "dead
storage" exception applied to the vehicle resulting in harm to his brother, and
concluded it was undergoing maintenance at the time the accident occurred. In
reaching its decision, the Holliman Court cited the opinion of the Alabama Supreme
Court in Broadway, supra, and noted: "We agree . . . that when a vehicle is being
maintained, as it was in this case, it is not in dead storage. The facts in this case
present no substantial evidence that this vehicle was in dead storage within the
meaning of the policy." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Mascair v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 619 So.2d 108, 110 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993) ("An
automobile undergoing maintenance cannot be in dead storage and vice versa"); North
Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 442 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.App. 1989) (Inoperable vehicle
which had not been driven or moved for four years and undergoing repairs for sale was
not in "dead storage," notwithstanding fact that vehicle was covered with weeds and
hay); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allaire, 25 Mass.App. 159, 516 N.E.2d 179
(1987) (Unregistered, uninsured vehicle "taken off road" by owner and undergoing
maintenance held not to be in "dead storage").
Similarly, in Hollis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 416 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga.App.
1992), the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded a vehicle that had not run in more
than two years, and had been stored in a homeowner's driveway during the foregoing
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period, nonetheless constituted a "motor vehicle" under the terms of a homeowner's
insurance contract, and, therefore, fell within the contract's exclusion for "bodily injury
or property damage . . . arising out of the . . . ownership, maintenance, use, loading or
unloading of motor vehicles . . . owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any
insured." The Hollis Court based its decision in substantial part upon the fact that,
while the vehicle was not operable at the time of the subject accident, it was equipped
with a battery and tires, and the claimants had been "attempting to use the car as a
motor vehicle." Id. at 829.
In Robertson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 565 (Conn.App. 1990), the
Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected a claim for benefits under a homeowner's
insurance contract in connection with damages sustained by the insured's antique
automobile which had been stored in the garage of insured's home. In upholding the
trial court's findings, the Robertson Court stated:
The policy excludes coverage for "motorized land vehicles
. . . designed for travel on public roads as subject to motor
vehicle registration." The trier found that the plaintiffs car,
even disassembled met this definition of a motor vehicle.
The trier found that the vehicle was designed for highway
travel would be subject to vehicle registration when that use
was made, and that the vehicle did not meet the definition
of personal property.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
As noted above, Appellees have never, at any point in these proceedings, raised
the "dead storage" exception to the automobile exclusions of the homeowner's insurance
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contract as a basis for a finding of coverage under that contract Accordingly, the
summary judgment order entered by Judge Noel, and from which this appeal arises,
never even considered the foregoing exception, and, therefore, it should not be
considered by this Court. However, assuming, arguendo, that Appellees had properly
raised this argument earlier in these proceedings, the undisputed facts of this case
definitively establish the "dead storage" exception is inapplicable. By Appellees' own
admission, the Volkswagen driven by Jennifer Heather Olson on the evening of
October 17, 1987, was in fact operable, and had been driven by the seventeen-year-old
on "numerous other occasions." These facts stand in stark contrast to the legal
authorities outlined above, including those cited by Appellees, which involve vehicles
deemed to be in "dead storage" due largely to the fact they were inoperable at the
time the relevant incidents occurred.
Finally, there is no basis for Appellees' assertion they are entitled to coverage
under the terms of the insurance contract since the phrase "dead storage" is not
expressly defined within the contract. According to Appellees, because the phrase
"dead storage" is not addressed in the "Definitions" portion of the insurance contract, it
is "at best ambiguous, thereby allowing this Court of Appeals to construe the term
most strictly against American Fire and most broadly in favor of coverage for the
Olsons." See Brief of Appellees, at 16.
The foregoing argument is wholly inconsistent with basic laws of insurance
contract interpretation. As American noted in its Brief, insurance contract provisions
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limiting or excluding coverage should be construed against the insurer, and that
ambiguous language "fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed
in favor of coverage." U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah
1993) (citations omitted). If an insurance contract is not ambiguous, however, "no
presumption in favor of the insured arises and the policy language is construed
according to its usual and ordinary meaning." Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274 (citations omitted).
In addition, terms in an insurance contract "are not necessarily ambiguous simply
because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his
or her own interests." Id. at 1274-75 (citations omitted).
Addressing the interpretation of insurance contracts in Robertson, supra, the
Appellate Court of Connecticut noted: "[W]e will not 'torture words to import
ambiguity.'" Id. at 566 (quoting Carley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 10 Conn.App.
135, 142, 521 A.2d 1053 (1987)). Applying this principle, the Robertson Court rejected
the insured's claims that various terms in the insurance contract at issue were
ambiguous, and should be resolved in his favor. In reaching this decision, the court
relied upon the fact that "[njothing in the trier's memorandum of decision indicates that
he found the specific terms of the insurance policy to be vague or ambiguous . . . ."
Id. In this case, just as in Robertson, there was no finding by Judge Noel, in granting
the motion for partial summary judgment, that the phrase "dead storage" was vague or
ambiguous, nor is there any other evidence to support such a finding.
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There is no basis for Appellees' claimed entitlement to raise the "dead storage"
exception as an issue on appeal, an issue they have had innumerable opportunities over
the course of the past several years to address. However, even if they were entitled to
raise the "dead storage" exception at the present time, the foregoing exception is
entirely inapplicable in light of the undisputed facts and circumstances at issue in this
case. As Appellees themselves contend, Jennifer Heather Olson drove the Volkswagen
involved in the collision with Myra Taylor "on numerous occasions prior to the accident
on October 17, 1987," and, therefore., that vehicle could not fall within the ambit of the
"dead storage" exception of the homeowner's insurance contract.
V.
THE INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSON APPELLEES AND
AMERICAN UNEQUIVOCALLY EXCLUDES THE CLAIMS CONTAINED IN
COUNT FIVE OF THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT FILED BY MYRA TAYLOR
AGAINST THE OLSONS.
Count 5 of Taylor's Complaint against the Olsons, entitled "Liability of Ronald
H. Olson and Carol D. Olson for Failure to Properly Supervise and Control the
Conduct of their Minor Child Heather," is unambiguously excluded under the terms of
the subject insurance contract. Insofar as Count 5 of the Complaint filed in the Taylor
v. Olson litigation stems directly from Jennifer Heather Olson's use of a vehicle owned
by Ronald Olson, the contract exclusions definitively bar any claim for benefits
Appellees could assert under the terms of that contract.
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Notwithstanding the clarity of the foregoing exclusions, Appellees are once again
attempting to create the illusion of ambiguity in their discussion of vicarious parental
liability, as well as "other exclusions" argued in Point 5 of their Brief. Just as with the
"dead storage" exception raised by Appellees for the first time on appeal, however,
none of the exclusions discussed in Point 5 of the Brief of Appellees were deemed
vague or ambiguous by the trial court, nor were any of these exclusions found to be
vague or ambiguous in the Order granting partial summary judgment which comprises
the entire basis of this appeal 1
In support of their claimed ambiguities, Appellees provide extensive excerpts
from the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Sandt, previously discussed above and
by American in its Brief, as well as extensive excerpts from other cases addressing the
construction of ambiguities and exclusions in insurance contracts, which excerpts are
quoted in more than two full pages of footnotes. Following these case quotations,
however, Appellees simply assert: "For the above reasons, the Plaintiffs [sic] submit
there are at least the four (4) ambiguities discussed above with respect to the
'exclusionary' language in the Defendant's [sic] insurance policy." See Brief of

Appellees erroneously contend that American's assertion
t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t is in n o w a y a m b i g u o u s in i t s
e x c l u s i o n o f c o v e r a g e "is m a d e w i t h o u t a n y c i t a t i o n t o o r
discussion
of e v e n o n e c a s e from U t a h t a l k i n g a b o u t
what
c o n s t i t u t e s a n 'ambiguity. 1 1 1
S e e B r i e f of A p p e l l e e s , a t 2 0 .
A p p e l l e e s h a v e i n e x p l i c a b l y o v e r l o o k e d t h a t A m e r i c a n d o e s , in f a c t ,
c i t e t o t w o d e c i s i o n s of t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t d i s c u s s i n g a l l e g e d
a m b i g u i t i e s in i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t s , w h i c h d e c i s i o n s a r e d i s c u s s e d
on t h e v e r y p a g e of A m e r i c a n ' s B r i e f from w h i c h A p p e l l e e s q u o t e .
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Appellant, at 25. (The "four ambiguities" to which Appellees refer, which are noted in
footnote 25 of their Brief, are the "dead storage" exception discussed above, and the
three automobile exclusions of the homeowner's insurance contract discussed extensively
in the Brief of Appellant.)
Judge Noel made no findings or conclusions of any kind in this case to support
Appellees' assertion that any of the three automobile exclusions contained in the
insurance contract, or the "dead storage" exception to these exclusions, were vague or
ambiguous. Moreover, the Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of
Appellees, which comprises the entire basis for this appeal, includes no findings that
any of the automobile exclusions, or the "dead storage" exception, are vague or
ambiguous. Accordingly, Appellees cannot now contend any such ambiguities exist, and
should be addressed by this Court, especially in light of the fact that any such
arguments could have been raised during the years this lawsuit was pending at the trial
court level. See Robertson, 569 A.2d at 566; Mascaro, 741 P.2d at 938,
Even if Appellees were allowed to present these claimed ambiguities at the
present time, they have offered no basis for their assertion that any of these terms are,
in fact, ambiguous. Instead of providing this foundation, Appellees provide some
lengthy quotations discussing insurance contracts and ambiguities in general, yet at no
point in their Brief do Appellees buttress the claimed "ambiguities" with a fact-specific
discussion of the insurance contract and circumstances at issue herein.
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Once again, Appellees appear to be hopeful that by claiming any item not
specifically addressed in the "Definitions" section of the subject insurance contract is
ambiguous, the homeowner's insurance contract should be found to provide coverage
for the automobile-related claims asserted by Myra Taylor against the Olsons. As the
Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Alf, terms contained in an insurance contract "are
not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a
different interpretation according to his or her own interests." 850 P.2d at 1274-75.
VL
THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OLSON
APPELLEES AND AMERICAN UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDES COVERAGE
FOR THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CLAIMS IN COUNT 5 OF THE
TAYLOR V. OLSON COMPLAINT.
As American discusses extensively in its Brief, the cause of action described in
Count 5 of the Taylor v. Olson Complaint, entitled "Liability of Ronald H. Olson and
Carol D. Olson for Failure to Properly Supervise and Control the Conduct of Their
Minor Child Heather," is unequivocally and unambiguously excluded by the terms of
the subject insurance contract. See Brief of Appellant, at 16-30. In addition,
American's discussion of the foregoing negligent supervision claim includes a lengthy
discussion of cases from numerous jurisdictions holding that such claims, as well as
claims of negligent entrustment, are excluded under the terms of the homeowner's
insurance contracts such as that entered into by American and the Olson Appellees.
See Brief of Appellant, at 17-25. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the negligent
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supervision claim of Myra Taylor against Ronald and Carol Olson is plainly excluded
under the terms of the homeowner's insurance contract at issue herein.

vn.
THE EXCLUSION FOR STATUTORILY IMPOSED VICARIOUS PARENTAL
LIABILITY CONTAINED IN THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE CONTRACT IS
NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY, NOR IS IT VOID.
Appellees contend that the exclusion in the homeowner's insurance contract for
statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability "is contrary to public policy and is
therefore void." See Brief of Appellees, at 43. In support of this contention,
Appellees cite to the sole authority of Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231
(Utah 1985). However, a review of the foregoing case reveals Appellees' reliance is
misplaced, insofar as that authority addressed an exclusion and factual circumstances
that are entirely distinct from those at issue in this case.
In Farmers, a minor child was injured by an automobile driven by his mother.
His father, as his guardian ad litem, subsequently filed an action against his mother to
recover medical expenses in the sum of $120,000.00, and general damages in the
amount of $1.5 million. Id. at 233. The Farmers Insurance Company automobile
policy which was issued to the mother of the minor contained the following exclusion:
This policy does not apply under Part I . . .
to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) any
member of the same household of such insured except a
servant . . . .
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Id. The Utah Supreme Court subsequently held that the foregoing exclusion was
contrary to public policy, as well as violative of the provisions of the No-Fault
Insurance Act. Id. at 233-36.
The instant case involves the application of an entirely different exclusion from
that which was at issue in Farmers. Moreover, unlike Farmers, this lawsuit involves an
accident in which the minor child was the tortfeasor, involved in an accident with
someone outside of the household, as opposed to Farmers, wherein the minor child
was the victim of another member of the household.
The exclusion for statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability contained in the
homeowner's insurance contract is valid under Utah law, and is not contrary to public
policy. Moreover, the foregoing exclusion definitively bars any coverage for any bodily
injury or property damage arising out of statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability
for the actions of Jennifer Heather Olson in this case.
VIIL
AMERICAN SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TAYLOR V.
OLSON LITIGATION.
As noted in its Brief, American acknowledges the general rule that "when an
insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against
him and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses, is bound by the findings and
judgement therein." McCartv v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). However, as the
Utah Supreme Court also noted in that decision, this general rule "does not extend to
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matters collateral or immaterial to the essential issues involved in the case, but is
limited to those necessary to determination of the controversy between the immediate
parties." Id.
Based upon the foregoing authority, and the rationale of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.
1993), reh. den. 992 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1993), discussed in the Brief of Appellant,
assuming the exclusions of the homeowner's contract did not definitively bar coverage
for all those causes of action asserted in the Taylor v. Olson Complaint, American
would not be bound by the self-serving Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
prepared by counsel for Taylor prior to becoming counsel for Taylor and the Olsons.
However, as discussed extensively above, and throughout the course of these
proceedings, all the causes of action contained in the Taylor Complaint, including
Count 5, are unambiguously excluded under the plain language of the homeowner's
insurance contract, which includes a specific exclusion for bodily injury or property
damage "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor
vehicles owned or operated by an insured."
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DC
APPELLEES CAN DEMONSTRATE NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Assuming, arguendo, the claims of Myra Taylor against the Olson Appellees in
Taylor v. Olson were not expressly excluded under the homeowner's insurance contract
between the Olsons and American, Appellees would be entitled to recover their
defense costs in this case under the terms of that contract. However, as discussed
extensively above, and in the Brief of Appellant, all claims asserted in the Taylor
Complaint were, in fact, unambiguously excluded under the plain language of the
insurance contract between the Olson Appellees and American.
The only other basis upon which Appellees assert a claim for attorney's fees in
this case is Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As a basis for this claim,
Appellees contend that American has failed to address Count 5 of the Taylor
Complaint, and that American has not discussed the holding of Drysdale v. Rogers, 869
P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), pertaining to claims for negligent supervision. A review of
the pleadings and other documents on file with this Court in connection with the
appeal, as well as those documents filed with Judge Noel, reveal the foregoing
assertions are erroneous. Further, American has never contended, as Appellees
suggest, that Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, as well as upon the Brief of Appellant filed on
January 2, 1996, American respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, and conclude the homeowner's
insurance contract between American and the Olson Appellees unambiguously excludes
coverage for all those matters, events and damages alleged by Myra Taylor against the
Olsons as a result of the automobile accident occurring on October 17, 1987.
DATED this

of April, 1996.

KIRTON & McCONKIE

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
American Fire and Casualty
Company
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